The Affordability Problem / Film one
8 minutes 35 seconds · published 1 September 2026 · figures current to August 2026
Each one, what it's built from, and the date it's true as of. Nothing here is a forecast.
| Figure | Value | Series | As of |
|---|---|---|---|
| Income needed to qualify, 2019 | $51,557 | CSUSHPINSA + MORTGAGE30US | Oct 2019 |
| Income needed to qualify, today | $113,840 | CSUSHPINSA + MORTGAGE30US | Aug 2026 |
| Qualification hurdle, then → now | +120.8% | derived | Aug 2026 |
| Median pay, same window | $936 → $1,251 | LEU0252881500Q | Q4 2019 / Q2 2026 |
| The same house, then / now | $327,100 → $517,216 | MSPUS + CSUSHPINSA | Q4 2019 / May 2026 |
| Down payment, then / now | $65,420 → $103,443 | derived, 20% down | Aug 2026 |
| Mortgage rate, then / now | 3.69% → 6.65% | MORTGAGE30US | Oct 2019 / 20 Aug 2026 |
| Money supply, a generation apart | 6.2× larger | M2NS, Jul 1996 → Jul 2026 | Jul 2026 |
| Money supply added, Feb 2020 → Feb 2022 | $6,232.8B | M2SL | Feb 2022 |
| — as a percentage | +40.2% | M2SL | Feb 2022 |
| Largest 24-month increase on record | confirmed | prior max +28.8%, 1975–77 | series from 1959 |
| Fed balance sheet, Feb 2020 → peak | $4.16T → $8.97T | WALCL | 13 Apr 2022 |
| Fed funds, before / peak | 0.08% → 5.33% | FEDFUNDS | Feb 2022 / Aug 2023 |
| Length of the hike cycle | 16 months | FEDFUNDS | Mar 2022 → Jul 2023 |
| “Fastest in over forty years” | confirmed | +5.25 pts; only 1980–81 faster | Aug 2023 |
| Mortgage rate, peak | 7.79% | MORTGAGE30US | week of 26 Oct 2023 |
| Price alone would have added | +58.1% | derived, rate held at 3.69% | May 2026 |
| Rate alone would have added | +39.6% | derived, price held | Aug 2026 |
| Both together | +120.8% | 1.581 × 1.396 | Aug 2026 |
| If you added them instead | +97.8% | the mistake, shown struck through | Aug 2026 |
| The payment, same house, four ways | $1,203 / $1,902 / $1,680 / $2,656 | derived, P&I, 20% down | Aug 2026 |
| Full-time workers who qualify, 2019 | 47% | LEU0252881500Q | Q4 2019 |
| Full-time workers who qualify, today | about 21% | LEU0252881500Q + LEU0252911500Q | Q2 2026 |
| Households who could qualify | 61% → 38% | Census ASEC via IPUMS CPS | 2019 / 2024 |
| Home price since 2019 | +58.1% | CSUSHPINSA, repeat sales | May 2026 |
| Rent since 2019 | +34.1% | CUSR0000SEHA | Jul 2026 |
| Inflation, peak 12-month change | +9.06% | CPIAUCNS | Jun 2022 |
| Owners holding a rate below 3% | 20.0% | FHFA National Mortgage Database | Q3 2025 |
| Lock-in effect | 1pp gap → 9% fewer moves | Fonseca & Liu, J. Finance, 2024 | 2024 |
| Homes for sale, bottom of the freeze → now | 562,453 → 1,126,252 | ACTLISCOUUS | Mar 2023 / Jul 2026 |
| The Fed has cut, peak → now | 5.33% → 3.63% | FEDFUNDS | Aug 2023 / Jul 2026 |
| On hold since | January 2026 | FEDFUNDS | Aug 2026 |
| Months since the rate peak | 34 | derived | Aug 2026 |
Two of these have a clock on them. “On hold since January” breaks at the next cut, and “34 months” becomes 35 on 26 October 2026.
All public, all free to check. FRED codes in the right column.
| What | Publisher | Series |
|---|---|---|
| Money supply | Federal Reserve H.6 | M2SL, M2NS |
| Home prices | S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller | CSUSHPINSA |
| Median sale price | Census / HUD | MSPUS |
| Mortgage rates | Freddie Mac PMMS | MORTGAGE30US |
| Fed policy rate | Federal Reserve | FEDFUNDS |
| Wages | BLS, usual weekly earnings | LEU0252881500Q, LEU0252911500Q |
| Rent | BLS, rent of primary residence | CUSR0000SEHA |
| Inflation | BLS Consumer Price Index | CPIAUCNS |
| Homes for sale | Realtor.com active listings | ACTLISCOUUS |
| Fed balance sheet | Federal Reserve H.4.1 | WALCL |
| Rate distribution | FHFA National Mortgage Database | — |
| Household incomes | Census ASEC via IPUMS CPS | — |
| Lock-in effect | Fonseca & Liu, Journal of Finance, 2024 | — |
| National economies | IMF World Economic Outlook, Apr 2026 | — |
| Rent on a comparable house | Rentometer, mid-year report H1 2026 | — |
20% down, a 28% front-end ratio, principal and interest only, on a 30-year fixed at the rate quoted for that date. The 28% front-end ratio is the lender's conventional test: housing payment against gross pay.
One house, not the mix of houses that happened to sell. The 2019 median sale price is carried forward by Case-Shiller, which is a repeat-sales index — so what you're seeing is one asset repriced, not a shift toward bigger or smaller homes. The raw median sale price today is lower than the figure the film uses; that gap is mix, not error.
Mortgage rates are weekly survey averages. The 7.79% peak is the week of 26 October 2023. Where a rate is quoted as “now,” it is the most recent weekly print at the time of publication. The Fed's own rate is the effective rate, monthly average — where the film says “five and a half,” that is the top of the target range, and 5.33% is what the rate actually did.
A 58.1% price rise and a 39.6% rate effect do not add to 97.8%. They compound: 1.581 × 1.396 = 2.208, or +120.8%. The film shows the addition struck through, because the mistake is the point.
The worker figures are full-time workers, from the weekly earnings distribution — not the population, and not households. The household pair is dated 2019 against 2024, because household income data stops at 2024; it is the honest apples-to-apples comparison, and it counts everyone, including retirees and people not trying to buy.
If you pull ACTLISCOUUS you will find a lower reading than the one the film uses: 346,514 in February 2022, against the 562,453 quoted. That is not an error, and the wording is the reason. February 2022 is a month before the Fed's first hike — it is the bottom of the pandemic buying frenzy, when everything for sale sold. The freeze starts with the rate rise in March 2022, and its own bottom is March 2023. That is what “the bottom of the freeze” means, and it is the comparison the film makes. Measured from February 2022 instead, listings are up 3.25× rather than 2.00× — the film takes the smaller number, because it is the one that answers the question being asked.
Some of these series restate recent months after the fact. Case-Shiller has already revised May 2026 from the 335.104 the film used to 335.430, a change of +0.10%, which moves the qualifying income by about $110. Figures are quoted as published, and every one is dated. Where a revision is large enough to change a claim, it goes in Corrections below, with both values and the date.
Nothing on this site or in the film is adjusted for inflation. Where inflation appears it is reported as what it did, from the published index — never used to deflate someone's income.
None yet. When there are, they appear here — what was wrong, what it is now, and the date it changed. Nothing gets quietly edited. Found an error? Say so in the comments on the film, and cite the series.